Incident: British Airways B763 near London on Nov 9th 2015, engine shut down in flight
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Friday, 13 November 2015
B767-300 BA Engine In-Flight Shutdown
Monday, 28 September 2015
Wednesday, 9 September 2015
SIM Training SOPS & PROCEDURES -B757 Initial
Takeoff Calls:
PF (TAKEOFF Pg) PM (LEGS Page)
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Go-AROUND Calls / Missed Approach Proc.:
PF PM
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>@400' Call "LNAV" or "HDG SELECT"
>@1000'
>"CLIMB THRUST/ VNAV / Center CMD"
>Call "FLAPS __" (FRA)
>AFTER TAKEOFF Check
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@ 400' Select Roll Mode (LNAV)
@1000' >Speed-UP & Call "CLIMB THRUST"
>Call "FLAPS __" (FRA)
>Select FLCH or VNAV
>Call "AFTER T.O. Checklist"
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Descent Procedure:
PF PM
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Landing Roll Procedure:
PF PM
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Landing Altitude SET in Window
Review ALERT MESSAGES
Set VREF / +40/+80 (APCH PG)
Set RADIO / BARO Minimums
Verify NAV Radios / Course Set
Set AUTOBRAKE /Assess Ldg.Perf.
Complete APPCH BRIEFING & DES CHECK
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>Verify Thrust Levers Closed
>Call "SPEEDBRAKES UP"
>Call "Reversers NORMAL"
>Call "60 KTS"
>Disarm Autobrake / Disconnect autopilot
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Approach Procedure (18,000'):
PF PM
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After Landing Procedure:
PF PM
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@10,000 Set L&R LANDING LTS -ON
@ Transition Set/X-check Altimeters
Start APU (Low Viz Approaches)
Call APPROACH Checklist
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>SPEEDBRAKE Lever to Down
>Exterior Lights per Captain Request
>Flap Lever to UP/WX Radar OFF
>Transponder STBY / Park ILS / 3-Trim
>MCP ALT to 9900 & Start APU
>AUTOBRAKES Off
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Landing Procedure - ILS Calls:
PF PM
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Landing Procedure - VNAV APPROACH Calls:
PF PM
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Call "FLAPS ___"
Arm APP Mode
Call GEAR-DOWN / FLAPS 20
Arm SPDBRAKE Call "FLAPS ___"
Set Missed Apch Alt.
Call "LANDING Checklist"
Verify Crossing Altitude
@ 500' Verify Autoland Status
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Build /Brief / Bug / Brakes
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Cold A/C: Bat & Stby Pwr -ON
Check Electric HYD Pumps -OFF
Gear Handle / Altern. Flap Sw's.
Check Status
Start APU
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C- Center ILS Tune
A-APU On
T-Taxi charts Avbl
2 (or3) - AUTOBRAKE 2/3
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Cat 1 -Set RADalt @ -20' / Baro is set to @DA (as Pub.)
Cat2 - Set RADalt @(as Pub.) / Baro @Alert Ht (ie 440')
Cat3- Set Radalt @ 0' / Baro is set @Alert Ht (ie440')
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L.- Lateral NAV Mode
A.- MDA Altitude (round-down using VS or VNAV)
V. -VS or VNAV
S.- Speed Window OPEN
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>PM Calls "APPROACHING G/PTH"
>@ 2nm from FAF (After ALT HOLD or VNAV PATH annunciated):
-Verify Autopilot Engaged
-Set DA or MDA on the MCP
-Select or Verify VNAV
-Verify SPEED INTERVENTION
>Call "GEAR DOWN / FLAPS 20"
-Arm SPDBRAKE
-FLAPS ___" (30)
>Call "LANDING CHECKLIST"
@ 300' Below Missed Apch Altitude ...Set MA Altitude
@ FAF Verify Altitude
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Wednesday, 2 September 2015
Tuesday, 28 April 2015
Lithium-ion batteries on Cargo Aircraft
Cargolux bans lithium-ion batteries after fire analysis
Freight operator Cargolux is preparing to suspend transport of lithium-ion battery consignments in light of recent re-assessment of the potential hazards they pose.
Cargolux has reviewed data from ICAO, the US FAA and Boeing centred on the effectiveness of on-board extinguishing systems against lithium battery fires.
Last August the FAA presented the results of a full-scale fire test, using a Boeing 727 freighter, to an air safety forum.
The test showed that containment of a lithium-ion fire on the main deck was “marginal” while a blaze involving lithium metal cells was not contained.
Cargolux had already banned the carriage of lithium metal cells.
But it says that analysis of fire-extinguishing system capabilities and the temperature that lithium-ion batteries can reach have spurred the airline to impose a temporary suspension on transport of such batteries from 1 May.
“To lift the ban as soon as possible, Cargolux will assess different options to identify if technology exists – or if new technology can be developed – in order to make the transportation of bulk shipments of lithium batteries safe,” says the carrier.
Cargolux operates a fleet of 23 Boeing 747-8 and 747-400 freighters. Lithium batteries are suspected to have been involved in two fatal cargo 747 fires in the past five years.
Lithium-ion batteries contained in other equipment will be exempt from the suspension, says the carrier.
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UPS probe: Battery fire can be uncontrollable in 10min
United Arab Emirates investigators have been unable to pinpoint the precise reason for the auto-ignition of a batch of lithium batteries, the resulting fire from which brought down a UPS Boeing 747-400F.
It confirms previous findings that the blaze started on the forward main deck, in a zone located 12.5-15.5m (41-51ft) behind the nose. The area is immediately below truss assemblies supporting flight-control cables.
The UAE's General Civil Aviation Authority says it determined with "reasonable certainty" that the location of the fire was in an area of cargo that contained lithium batteries.
Investigators have not determined exactly when the fire ignited. The probe says the batteries, "for reasons which cannot be established", entered a state of energetic failure and thermal runaway, resulting in auto-ignition. Smoke detectors did not pick up the initial signs of fire. The inquiry notes that pallets with rain covers "can contain smoke until a large fire has developed".
Based on cargo pallet and container testing by the US National Transportation Safety Board, says the inquiry, a "large catastrophic fire" which "cannot be contained" can develop in the space of 10min.
Investigators have not determined how long the UPS 747 fire was burning before the pilots received the first alarm, about 22min into the flight to Cologne, but says it possibly ignited 10-15min beforehand.
"Less than three minutes after the first warning to the crew, the fire resulted in severe damage to flight control systems and caused the upper deck and cockpit to fill with continuous smoke," the inquiry says.
At least three shipments of lithium batteries were identified as being in pallet positions consistent with the origin of the fire. The inquiry says these should have been declared as dangerous cargo during loading in Hong Kong, but states: "There were no declared shipments of hazardous materials on board the accident flight."
Neither pilot survived the crash, which occurred as the aircraft attempted to return to Dubai on 3 September 2010.
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Korean investigators have revealed only 18min elapsed between detection of fire on board an Asiana Airlines Boeing 747-400F, and the fatal loss of the aircraft in the sea. But while the inquiry has disclosed more details of the dangerous cargo on board the aircraft, it has yet to reach conclusions over the origin of the fire.
The cargo jet, operating Seoul-Shanghai on 28 July 2011, crashed about 130km (70nm) west of Jejuwhile attempting to divert to the island. Preliminary findings by Korea's Aircraft and Railway Accident Investigation Board show the aircraft was 50min into its flight and had just been transferred toShanghai area control centre when it made the emergency call.
RUDDER DIFFICULTIES
One of the pilots mentioned an aft cargo fire and that the aircraft was descending to 10,000ft (3,050m). It turned north-east, requesting radar vectors to Jeju.
Data from Seoul Incheon area centre indicates the aircraft, travelling at about 400kt (740km/h), continued to descend to about 8,000ft before climbing again, in an unstable vertical profile.
Communications with air traffic controllers in Seoul were relayed via a Korean Air aircraft which was operating near the stricken jet. These communications also included a statement from the Asiana captain that the rudder control "is not working".
The Incheon data shows the aircraft was rising and sinking before it climbed to about 14,000ft and sharply descended.
Data from a Korean monitoring and control station suggest the aircraft fell some 10,000ft in 90s. As it descended, the captain again said there were problems with the rudder and flight controls and the first officer added, shortly afterwards: "We have heavy vibration on the airplane, may need to make an emergency landing, emergency ditching. Altitude control is not available due to heavy vibration, going to ditch." Contact with the aircraft was then lost. During the emergency, about 18min, the aircraft's ACARS addressing system issued several main-deck fire-detection messages as well as failure signals relating to the yaw damper and flight recorder.
Search teams - hampered by atrocious weather, including seven typhoons - combed the area in the weeks after the accident but failed to detect a signal from flight recorder locator beacons. Operations to retrieve wreckage, however, continued until mid-June. Wreckage analysis showed severe damage to the airframe, from fuselage station 1700 to the aft pressure bulkhead, and this section appears to have sustained the greatest fire damage. Much of the damage occurred between the aft main-deck freight door and the L5 door after exposure to the highest temperatures - illustrated by severe thermal damage on the interior structure and discolouration of the paint on the exterior of the skin. Soot trails on the aft external skin indicated smoke had exited outflow valves. There was also evidence of sooting "all the way forward" on the main cargo deck, the inquiry says, on ceiling liners beneath the cockpit. When the aircraft was loaded at Seoul Incheon airport, 24 cargo positions on the main deck and 11 in the lower hold were used.
The main-deck pallets included two which were listed as containing dangerous goods, loaded into the positions designated ML and PR, adjacent to the rear freight door. Among these hazardous shipments were lithium-ion batteries - for use in hybrid electric vehicles - as well as highly-flammable and corrosive liquids, for integrated-circuit manufacture, plus lacquers and paints.
Lithium batteries have long been a concern to operators, and earlier this year the International Civil Aviation Organisation examined new safety standards in the wake of the Asiana crash and the loss of a UPS 747-400F in Dubai after an in-flight fire in September 2010.
BATTERIES CONCERN
One of Asiana's instructors, exclusively in charge of dangerous goods training for the carrier's pilots, told the inquiry he had emphasised pilot awareness of safety standards for lithium batteries following the UPS accident.
The inquiry points out that results of various electrical and shock tests carried out by the battery manufacturer two years before the crash indicated "no problems that would lead to thermal runaway or fire". It adds that the manufacturer has adopted a 10% state-of-charge for all its lithium-ion battery shipments. Neither the loadmaster nor the nine handlers who dealt with the dangerous good placed on the Asiana aircraft observed any damage or leakage to the containers.
Asiana had taken delivery of the General Electric CF6-powered 747, which was built as a freighter, in February 2006 and the aircraft (HL-7604) had accumulated more than 28,750h in almost 4,800 cycles.
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US Testing of Lithium Batteries Alarms Aviation Officials
International aviation officials are trying to quickly come up with safer packaging for cargo shipments of lithium-ion batteries on passenger planes after U.S. testing confirmed that aircraft fire suppression systems can't prevent overheated batteries from causing powerful explosions and fires.
The hazardous cargo committee of the International Civil Aviation Organization, a U.N. agency, met this week in Montreal. Officials familiar with the discussions said the panel heard a detailed presentation by aircraft manufacturers and pilot unions on the potential for the batteries to cause an explosion and resulting fire capable of destroying a plane.
The committee agreed to create a special working group to try to come up with packaging for batteries that would contain any fire or explosive gases to the inside of the package, officials said. If the working group cannot come up with such packaging, officials said they consider it likely that a formal proposal to ban bulk battery shipments from passenger planes will be offered at an ICAO meeting on dangerous cargo in October.
The batteries are used in devices from cellphones to electric cars. It's not unusual for as many as 80,000 batteries to be carried on board a plane. The global battery industry has been lobbying heavily against significant restrictions on battery shipments other than minor changes to current regulations.
Testing by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration over the past year and a half has repeatedly shown that a single short-circuiting battery in a large shipment of batteries can cause overheating to spread to other batteries. Fire suppression systems have been able to put out the initial flames, but they haven't been able to stop the spread of continually increasing temperatures known as thermal runaway.
The overheated batteries emit a mixture of explosive gases, of which hydrogen is the most abundant. As the gases build up, they eventually explode and ignite an intense fire.
An FAA test in February resulted in a powerful explosion despite being conducted in a pressurized chamber with an atmosphere of 5 percent halon. Halon is the main gas used to suppress fires in the cargo compartments of passenger planes. Triggered by smoke, fire suppression systems unleash halon until the gas reaches 5 percent of the air in the cargo compartment. It has long been accepted by aviation authorities that this level of halon is enough to put out most fires, including a lithium-ion battery fire.
"We now no longer believe that would be the case," said pilot Mark Rogers, who represents the Air Line Pilots Association in the U.S. and Canada and other international pilot unions on cargo issues in the civil aviation organization's proceedings.
The February test resulted in an explosion in which pressure in the chamber rose from a normal 15 pounds per square inch to 70 psi, according to an agency slide presentation. Without the presence of halon, the explosion was even more powerful, with pressure rising to about 80 psi.
Two safety experts interviewed by The Associated Press described an explosion of that force as "significant." John Goglia, a former National Transportation Safety Board member, said such an explosion could possibly blow a hole in a plane and cause depressurization for passengers without destroying the plane. He pointed to examples of planes that have landed safely after experiencing such a blowout.
Last month, the International Coordination Council of Aerospace Industry Associations, which represents aircraft companies such as Boeing and Airbus, and the pilot unions submitted a joint working paper to the civil aviation organization recommending a ban on bulk battery shipments on passenger planes until safer packaging can be developed. The paper, which is not considered a formal proposal under the U.N. agency's rules, called the threat of battery fires "an unacceptable risk."
The FAA tests show "the uncontrollability of lithium battery fires can ultimately negate the capability of current aircraft cargo fire suppression systems, and can lead to a catastrophic failure of the airframe," the position paper said.
"It has been our consistent position that theses batteries shouldn't be transported until (adequate packaging) standards are in place," Rogers said. "We'll continue to work with the manufacturers on influencing operators and getting the word out that aircraft cargo compartments aren't capable of handling a fire involving these materials."
A growing number of airlines have also said they will no longer accept bulk battery shipments, including Delta, United, Cathay Pacific, Qantas, British Airways and Cargolux.
Monday, 6 April 2015
Engines - Vibration Procedures
BOEING Flight Operations REVIEW
A MESSAGE TO FLIGHT CREWS FROM THE BOEING COMMERCIAL AIRPLANE GROUP
727-11
737-13
747-11
757-10
767-10
December 10, 1990
ENGINE VIBRATION PROCEDURES
Boeing continues to receive inquiries from operators regarding recommended procedures for high engine vibration. The following information summarizes the Boeing position on this subject.
Current FAR's require that AVM systems be installed in all large transport airplanes and, except for short periods allowed by the Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL), they must be operative.
AVM limits, if any, are provided by the engine manufacturer in their engine Operating Instructions (O.I.). However, except in a few cases, the engine manufacturers have not defined "hard" AVM
limits, i.e. amber bands, red lines, lights or EICAS messages where crew procedures or an engine shutdown is required solely on the bases of high AVM indications and without other abnormal
engine parameters. Instead, the engine manufacturers have provided AVM operating "guidelines" which were used to provide AVM procedures on three crew and 737 airplanes. Currently, flight crews on 707, 727, 737, and three crew 747 airplanes monitor engine and system indications and take actions based on observed trends to prevent exceeding engine operating limits. This sometimes includes precautionary engine shutdowns. AVM indications are included as one of the engine parameters to be used in judging the condition of the engine. Relative changes in AVM readings, as well as absolute values, are used as a cue to cross-check other engine parameters to determine the procedure to be used. This requires a continuous monitoring or awareness of the AVM indications. With the introduction of EICAS equipped 757, 767 and 747-400 airplanes, procedures were re-evaluated and all monitoring functions were placed in EICAS. Only parameters with published
operating limits were programmed to generate crew alert messages or indications. Procedures were written so that flight crews are not required to monitor, analyze or troubleshoot engine indications to diagnose problems or initiate procedures. The EICAS monitors designated engine parameters and alerts the crew when published limits are exceeded. Flight crew procedures are accomplished in response to these alerts. On some of the EICAS equipped airplanes, an AVM "pop-up" is provided at a predetermined value. However, with exception of the Rolls Royce powered 757, there are no associated high AVM procedures in the Operations Manual. The reason for the "pop-up" is for crew awareness and for entry in the airplane log book for maintenance trend monitoring. No crew action is required for an AVM "pop-up" unless there are other abnormal engine indications in these airplanes.
Since there are no published or defined AVM limits on EICASequipped airplanes (except on Rolls Royce powered 757's), EICAS only indicates existing AVM values but does not generate crew
alert messages based on these values. Because of this and because there are no defined "high" AVM limits, flight crews are not expected to respond to AVM indications without other abnormal
engine indications. On airplanes with AVM procedures, flight crews should also be made aware that AVM indications are not valid while at takeoff power settings, during power changes, or until after engine thermal stabilization. High AVM indications can also be observed during operations in icing conditions. For the above reasons, Boeing proposes no changes to the AVM procedures on EICAS equipped airplanes unless the engine manufacturers provide "hard" (not guideline) AVM limits. Boeing recommends that the AVM system be used for long-term engine condition trend monitoring. This can be accomplished by the flight crew recording the AVM values in the airplane log book
during stabilized cruise or by automatic recording as appropriate. In line with the above, flight crews should be instructed, in the absence of published AVM procedures, not to shutdown engines due
to high AVM indications unless there are other abnormal engine indications or other engine limits are exceeded.
Monday, 23 February 2015
Wednesday, 4 February 2015
Tuesday, 3 February 2015
Air France Flight 447 - Accident Animation Video
Air France Flight 447 Accident Animation Video
Published on 12 Dec 2014
Flight AF447 (Air France A330 mid Atlantic crash) - official BEA animation - illustration of information contained in flight report including flight inputs, airspeed, warnings etc.
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